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In this paper, aimed at dependently typed programmers, we present a novel connection
between automated and interactive theorem proving paradigms. The novelty is that the
connection offers a better trade-off between usability, efficiency and soundness when
compared to existing techniques. This technique allows for a powerful interactive proof
framework that facilitates efficient verification of finite domain theorems and guided
construction of the proof of infinite domain theorems. Such situations typically occur
with industrial verification. As a case study, an embedding of SAT and CTL
model-checking is presented, both of which have been implemented for the dependently
typed proof assistant Agda.
Finally an example of a real world railway control system is presented, and shown using
our proof framework to be safe with respect to an abstract model of trains not colliding
or derailing. We demonstrate how to formulate safety directly and show using interactive
theorem proving that signalling principles imply safety. Therefore, a proof by an
automated theorem prover that the signalling principles hold for a concrete system
implies the overall safety. Therefore instead of the need for domain experts to validate
that the signalling principles imply safety they only need to make sure that the safety is
formulated correctly. Therefore some of the validation is replaced by verification using
interactive theorem proving.
1. Introduction
Martin-Lo¨f dependent type theory offers a powerful mechanism to construct mathemat-
ical formulæ and write functional programs (Nordstro¨m, Petersson & Smith 1990); it is
essentially typed λ-calculus with the dependent product and algebraic data-types. By the
Curry-Howard correspondence (Curry 1934, Curry, Feys, Craig & Craig 1958, Howard
† Partly supported by Invensys Rail Systems, UK.
‡ Supported by EPSRC grant EP/G033374/1, theory and applications of induction-recursion. Part of
this work was done while the second author was a visiting fellow of the Isaac Newton Institute for
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1980), propositions can be represented as types, where an element of the type is a proof
of the proposition. Another perspective in type theory is that a type is a specification of
a problem such that its elements are programs that satisfy the specification.
In this paper, we investigate and actualise an embedding of automated theorem prov-
ing (ATP) decision procedures into Martin-Lo¨f dependent type theory. The motivation
is twofold. The first one is to integrate Agda (Bove, Dybjer & Norell 2009) with fast ex-
ternal tools that facilitate feasible verification of large finite problem sets, archetypal of
industrial verification. Secondly we want to explore a functional proof framework where
finite (or finitisable) components of a theorem are proved automatically and the infinite
components are proven with human guidance.
Mature proof assistants such as Isabelle and Coq have supported external tools for
many years (Bo¨hme & Nipkow 2010, Mu¨ller & Nipkow 1995, Boutin 1997), whereas
Agda, a less mature tool, does not yet. The fact that Agda is quite new has provided
an opportunity for the community to experiment with new approaches (some official
and some not) regarding many theoretical aspects of Interactive Theorem Proving (ITP)
tools. The new approaches taken in Agda have resulted in it being an intuitive proof
assistant which is also a programming language; programs and proofs are defined using
the same functional constructs that can be compiled and executed. We believe that Agda
can be extended into a platform for the development of verified software.
Our wider ambition is to have a substantial program (such as a critical system with
hundreds of variables) which executes in Agda and is proven to be correct with respect
to safety in the target domain. We have realised this ambition with a number of train
control systems, the largest system containing ≈ 600 propositional variables, and will give
full details about a smaller example (Section 5). In this scenario, concrete finite domain
theories need to be proven to show the system satisfies some properties, and abstract
infinite domain theories need to be proven that show correctness of the properties and
verification techniques.
One example, where the combination of finite domain theorems proved using ATP
and infinite domain theorems proved using ITP is of great benefit, is the reduction of
the problem of domain validation. We will give two case studies of how to carry this
out in Sections 4 and Section 5. Consider the development of a critical system that
must satisfy a number of safety conditions which are lemmata from the target domain.
Informally safety conditions are rules-of-thumb that are used by developers and testers
of critical systems. One can prove using ITP that these safety conditions imply the
actual “safety” of the system, where the concept of “safety” still remains to be validated
by domain experts, and is expressed as a theorem over infinite domains. For instance,
within the train domain where the safety conditions are synonymous with signalling
principles , it is possible (depending on the precise set of signalling principles in use)
to prove they imply that “trains do not collide or derail”. So instead of validating all
the safety conditions , some of them have been verified. It might be the case that the
safety conditions are insufficient to guarantee safety, or that some are redundant or
worse, contradictory. Thus part of the validation procedure (done by domain experts)
has become a verification procedure (done by mathematicians), which reduces the total
amount of validation required and increases trust that the system is safe. Then as a
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concrete step, we develop in Agda and verify with (possibly certified) ATP tools that the
system satisfies the safety conditions . Thus the actual “safety” of the system has been
shown (in Agda) to follow from the safety conditions , not only that the system satisfies
the safety conditions . In this work it is not essential (but complimentary) that the ATP
tools are certified, it is however recommended that the tools are well-established and
widely trusted within the ATP/verification communities.
1.1. Related Work
Since N. de Bruijn introduced AUTOMATH in the late 1960’s (de Bruijn 1970), the
ITP community has studied the issue of automatically solving problem sets many times
(Bierman, Gordon, Hrit¸cu & Langworthy 2010, Bo¨hme & Nipkow 2010, Boutin 1997,
Fontaine, Marion, Merz, Nieto & Tiu 2006), and many more. We have during this research
identified three existing approaches for integrating automated and interactive theorem
proving, none of which categorises our approach.
Oracle. The use of an oracle, which is an operation that provides a proof of a theorem,
and which when invoked calls an external tool. See for instance approaches by Owre
and Rush in PVS; Tverdyshev, Mu¨ller and Nipkow in Isabelle; and Bierman, Gordan
and Langworthy in M (Owre, Rushby & Shankar 1992, Mu¨ller & Nipkow 1995, Bier-
man et al. 2010). There are too many interactive tools to list that use external tools
as oracles, but relevant to this project is the RODIN tool set (Abrial, Butler, Haller-
stede & Voisin 2006) which is similar to PVS in that it tries to help system developers
write verified software. The problem with this approach is that the result of the oracle
does not reduce to head normal form, and therefore destroys the ability to execute
programs. Another problem is that it is not clear whether the external tool is correct
and whether the result of the external tool was interpreted correctly.
Reflection. The correctness of a decision procedure is verified in the ITP tool, and from
this proof a verified ATP tool (Boutin 1997) is extracted. The extracted program is
called by a tactic to build a proof. This approach has for instance been taken by
Verma; Hendriks; and Lescuyer and Conchon (Verma 2000, Hendriks 2002, Lescuyer
& Conchon 2008), and has been widely applied within the Coq community. Reflection
requires a correctness proof for an ATP tool in the ITP tool; proving the correctness
for state-of-the-art theorem provers would be cumbersome and one would expect the
stat-of-the-art tools to have significantly improved by the time the proof is complete.
Oracle with Justifications. One uses an ATP tool which provides in case of a positive
answer a proof-object (Diller & Troelstra 1984), which can then be translated auto-
matically into an ITP proof of the corresponding ITP formula. Since the ITP proof
is now checked, the correctness relies entirely on the correctness of the ITP checker.
Furthermore, a proof-object is kept and therefore the ATP has to be executed only
once. This approach has been used for instance by (Paulson & Susanto 2007, Bo¨hme &
Nipkow 2010, Dong, Ramakrishnan & Smolka 2003, Weber 2006, Fontaine et al. 2006).
Notably Simon Foster has used this technique to connect Agda with Waldmeis-
ter (Foster & Struth 2011). Problems are that creating the proof-object slows down
the ATP tool, and that many ATP tools do not provide a proof-object. Further-
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more the proofs provided by the ATP tool might be very big (proof sizes of several
hundreds of Megabytes have been reported for Satisfiability Modulo Theories (SMT)
solving (Stump 2009)). Therefore checking translated ITP proofs might be infeasible,
especially when dealing with type theoretic ITP tools. This is due the size of the
proof terms and garbage collection issues.
Remark: It should be noted that the paradigms of oracles, and oracles with justifications
have been identified as far back as 1970 (de Bruijn 1970). A good introduction to the
various different flavours of theorem proving can be found in (Harrison 2008), and a more
technical discussion in (Boutin 1997). A review of formal methods relating to industrial
projects can be found in (Woodcock, Larsen, Bicarregui & Fitzgerald 2009).
1.2. Our Approach – Oracles & Reflection
Assume a logic (such as propositional), define the set of formulæ and a satisfaction
relation with respect to the logic. Then the decision procedure is implemented in Agda’s
logic with the focus on an easy proof of correctness rather than efficiency (in fact the
implementation could be na¨ıve and highly inefficient). It is then proved to be correct
with respect to the satisfaction relation. In Agda, a function’s implementation can be
overridden by a native Haskell implementation (after checking that the function fulfils a
number of axioms); using this fact, the inefficient decision procedure is replaced by a call
to an external ATP tool. Evaluation of the decision procedure is as follows: if applied to
a closed term, the efficient ATP tool is executed; if applied to an open term, the na¨ıve
(inefficient) Agda implementation is evaluated. Since the correctness proof refers to open
terms, it refers to the Agda implementation and not the ATP tool. If the resulting proof-
object is inspected, it is lazily evaluated using the na¨ıve implementation; otherwise it
behaves as if it has been postulated.
In order to make sure that the native implementation is used correctly, we make sure
that the input language of the overridden function is an Agda representation of the
input language of the tool. If the original problem requires a translation into this input
language, then we define the correctness of the problem in the input language of the tool,
and a translation of the original problem into this input language. Then we prove that if
the correctness of the problem related to the input language holds, then the correctness of
the intended original problem holds as well. Therefore the translation is provably correct.
An example is CTL model-checking (see Section 2.4), where the transition relation is
made total before executing the external tool. The function overridden requires that the
transition relation is total. The problem for the non-total transition relation is inside
of Agda reduced to this situation. To increase trustworthiness, the input and outputs
of the ATP tool are logged, allowing a user to manually verify the translation and the
tool’s result are correct. Our approach yields a high-level of soundness and efficiency
when using certified ATP tools. See Section 2.2 for technical details on the embedding
and Section 1.3.1 for a discussion of the soundness.
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1.3. Comparison with Existing Approaches
Obviously, compared with only using an oracle the approach has the advantage that
proofs normalise and programs can be extracted. Both the oracle and our approach
become inconsistent if the result of the external tool is incorrect, see Lemma 2.1.
Pure reflection has the highest level of soundness of all approaches as no external tools
are used. In comparison, our approach, in the case of open terms is equivalent; but in
the case of closed terms weakens soundness and significantly increases efficiency.
The third approach where the external ATP tool provides a justification is motivated
by the fact that in many cases, non-trivial translations into the ATP tool’s input lan-
guage are defined outside the logic of the ITP tool, making it hard to prove that they
preserve correctness (Fontaine et al. 2006). Instead with our approach these translations
are defined inside Agda, mitigating this requirement. It follows from this that in our ap-
proach the tools do not need to compute justifications, and hence the tools can be more
efficient, and the choice of tool is less restrictive. The ATP tool can range from unverified
state-of-the-art tools to certified but technologically less advanced tools. In summation,
we trade the high-level soundness assurances that justifications provide for an increase
in efficiency, flexibility and usability; this soundness trade-off is minimal when using cer-
tified external tools. Also in our approach there is no need for the ITP tool to store and
check the justifications.
One should as well note that whatever we do in order to guarantee the correctness of
proofs carried out using ITP, we can never obtain absolute certainty. We will always rely
on the correctness of the checker of theorems in the ITP (which are usually not formally
verified), and on the correctness of its logic (most ITP tools substantially deviate from
the underlying logical theories in order to be more user friendly). Then we rely as well on
the correctness of the compiler (it is well known that most compilers have errors) used to
compile the ITP tool, and on the underlying operating system. And ultimately Go¨del’s
incompleteness theorem shows that it is impossible to guarantee that the underlying
mathematical theory is consistent.
1.3.1. Soundness. This approach is sound, provided the ITP tool (Agda) is sound and
the ATP tool gives the correct output, which means that it returns true, if the formula
to be proved is valid, and false if it is not. The reason is that one shows in Agda that the
inefficient function which is to be overridden, fulfils this property. Since there is only one
such function, the overridden function returns the same result as the original inefficient
function defined in Agda. So Agda with the function overridden is equivalent to Agda
without it, and if the latter is sound, so is Agda with the overriding mechanism.
The logging of the answers of the ATP tool gives the user the possibility to check
whether the instances used the ATP tool gave the correct answer (e.g. by checking using
alternative tools), and therefore reduces the reliance on the soundness of the ATP tool.
We note as well that the input to the ATP tool will be done in the language of the
ATP tool (using a syntactic representation in Agda). The translation of the original
problem into the ATP tool’s input language is done inside Agda, and therefore shown to
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be correct. This avoids the problem of an erroneous translation, which might for instance
happen if the translation is carried out by a program outside Agda.
We think as well that many ATP tools are at least as trustworthy as Agda itself (if
not even more), so this approach won’t weaken the correctness of Agda.
1.3.2. Intuitionism and Classic Provers. We note that the use of SAT solvers based on
classical logic are compatible with the intuitionistic type theory of Agda: the SAT solver
is only applied to formulæ formed from decidable prime formulæ (e.g. formulæ of the
form T (b) for a Boolean term b), for which the principle of tertium non datur holds
intuitionistically. The principle of tertium non datur holds for all propositional formulæ,
provided it holds for the atomic formluæ this formula is built of, so for these formulæ
classical logic holds in intuitionistic type theory. In the case of CTL, one can show as
well the principle of tertium non datur, provided it holds for the atomic formulæ it is
built from.
In fact the decidability of the validity of formulæ expresses that tertium non datur
holds. Therefore any theory with decidable validity fulfils tertium non datur.
1.4. Overview
Section 2.1 provides a comparison of automated and interactive theorem proving tech-
niques and an overview of finite and infinite theories, Section 2.2 introduces the technique
used for embedding ATP theories into type theory. Section 2 then concludes with two
examples of the embedding, the first example being Boolean tautology checking, and
the second example being Computation Tree Logic (CTL) model-checking in Section 2.3
and Section 2.4, respectively.
Section 3 discusses how Agda was extended to allow for the technique described in this
paper. This entailed extending the type-checker to check the decision procedures against
axioms and low-level interfacing of the external ATP. Furthermore, a generic plug-in
interface is described in Section 3.1.
Sections 4 & 5 provide two examples of the composition with respect to specifying, de-
veloping, and verifying control systems for specific domains. We give an abstract notion
of safety, and show using ITP that safety conditions (in railways called signalling prin-
ciples) imply this safety. Then we verify using ATP that the safety conditions hold for a
concrete implementation, and therefore obtain overall safety of these implementations.
Finally, Section 6 summarises the paper and presents the concluding remarks.
2. Methodology
In this section we discuss the advantages and disadvantages of automated and interactive
theorem proving, and present a general technique of embedding automated theorem
proving theories. This is concluded with two examples of the embedding, namely Boolean
tautology checking and CTL model-checking.
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2.1. Comparison of Automated and Interactive Theorem Proving Techniques
Generally, theorem proving tools can be placed into one of two categories, interactive or
automatic (Boutin 1997). The first category, ATP tools attempt to prove a theorem by
automatically deducing the proof from already proven lemmata. In some cases, interme-
diate lemmata are introduced and proven automatically. The user has no direct influence
over the derivation and proving process. In this work, only ATP tools that coincide with
decision procedures for logics are considered as they are admissible intuitionistically; ex-
amples are SAT solving and model-checking. Conversely the second category is formed by
ITP tools, i.e. proof assistants or proof checkers; they work by allowing the user to guide
the derivations and proofs of lemmata, culminating in a proof of the desired theorem.
2.1.1. ATP tools are very powerful when dealing with concrete theorems over finite do-
mains as in SAT and finitisable domains as with temporal logics. In some cases ATP
tools can be applied to theorems over infinite domains as in SMT (Barrett, Sebastiani,
Seshia & Tinelli 2009) and first order provers, but this class of tools typically become
semi-decidable decision procedures (De Moura & Bjørner 2009) and are not considered
in this work. Industrial hardware and software verification is archetypal of finite concrete
theorems – large but not inherently complex problems†. ATP tools often allow the system
to be modelled using an intuitive language, and the desired properties of the system to
be specified in the tool’s logic. The tool will attempt to prove these properties, when this
is not possible the tool will either provide a counter-example of the property or declare
an unknown result. These unknown results typically occur as a result of attempting to
prove a theorem that has an infinite component and not knowing which lemma to apply
or when a resource (time or space) is not sufficient to complete the proof.
2.1.2. ITP tools are powerful when dealing with theorems over infinite domains for which
it is not known (at least currently) how to mechanise their proofs. Consider a theorem
of the form ∀n.ϕ in which ϕ has an infinite component. It could be possible to prove
it using standard induction, but often the theorem needs to be strengthened such that
the new theorem ∀n.ϕ ∧ ψ implies the desired theorem. The choice of this strengthened
theorem, in general requires input from a human being. The reason is that when proving
the inductive step, ϕ(n) might not be sufficient to imply ϕ(n + 1); whereas a stronger
theorem ϕ(n) ∧ ψ(n) might be sufficient. To choose ψ such that it is strong enough to
allow the theorem to be proved without being so strong that it hinders the proof is a
complex task and cannot be mechanised in general. ITP tools have the advantage that
unknown results do not occur as the user guides the proof and the tool checks that the
proof is correct.
2.1.3. Limitation of using ATP alone. As an example, consider a simple reactive sys-
tem realised using Boolean valued equations which compute the next state from the
current state and input variables. The most natural way to verify such a system is
† We refer to this type of verification as industrial.
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using SAT based verification. Assume a safety‡ property P . One would have to con-
struct the propositional formula which expresses that P holds in all reachable states,
i.e. ∀reachable state s.P (s). For small state spaces it is possible to enumerate all states
and take their conjunction, but for realistic systems this is not feasible§. Therefore the
fastest method to determine whether the system models P is to apply induction. This
would yield two proof obligations which take into account reachable states, namely the
base case (initial state) and inductive step (transition function). After the user has entered
these into a SAT solver and determined validity of both cases, there is still a meta-step
to be performed by the user. The meta-step here is to prove validity of induction outside
the SAT solver. The user can then assemble the three proofs to determine that P al-
ways holds in all reachable states. SAT solving alone is not sufficient to efficiently prove
this theorem. This example, perhaps contrived, shows the limitation of ATP alone, and
in general this final task of assembling proofs is more complicated. See Sections 4 & 5
for substantial examples where various ATP proofs are assembled to show that a road
crossing and a railway interlocking system are safe.
When using ITP tools on large finite concrete theorems the work delegated to the user
is exorbitant (Jones, Grov & Bundy 2010). Industrial verification is a special case where
large numbers of mechanisable, and a small number of un-mechanisable proof obligations
arise (Woodcock et al. 2009). It would be nice to use ATP tools for the mechanisable
proof obligations.
The next section discusses our embedding of ATP theories into type theory to mitigate
the user’s work-load.
2.2. General Technique
The embedding of a chosen ATP theory into type theory is as follows. Assume a logic L,
e.g. propositional logic, CTL or modal-µ calculus, that the chosen ATP theory is defined
over.
Formulæ in L are inductively defined types, whose elements are finite. These formulæ
can usually only hold with respect to a model M and an environment ξ. In this work,
the model is what is fixed and does not change and the environment is what varies.
For example, in CTL model-checking (see Section 2.4) the model is a transition system
and a state; the environment is an infinite run of the transition system from the state
identified in the model. In SAT (see Section 2.3) there is no model, but the environment
assigns Boolean values to variables in the formula. In the case of first order theorems the
model consists of the semantics of the signature and the environment is an assignment to
variables in the formula. For technical reasons, the model and environment are defined
first as the formulæ can depend upon these structures.
It is now possible to give semantics to these formulæ by defining a satisfaction relation
‡ A safety property is a property that must hold in all reachable states.
§ Consider a system with 600 state variables (not uncommon within industrial applications), there
would be 2600 conjuncts which is larger than the number of atoms in the observable universe.
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that assigns types to formulæ with respect to M and ξ.
J ⊧ K ∶Model → Formula→ Environment→ Set
The decision procedure DecM ∶ Formula → Bool for the ATP theory is formalised as
a function. In our experience an inefficient simplistic definition that recurses over the
structure of the formula, model and environment is preferable as this helps with proving




ξ.J M ⊧ ϕ Kξ
where the choice of quantification depends upon the ATP theory. E.g. in the case of the
Boolean satisfiability problem, we have “there exists a satisfying assignment” (satisfia-
bility testing) or “all assignments are satisfying” (tautology checking). It is possible to
define more complicated quantification schemes, whereby the environment is split into
sub-environments; but this is not considered in this work.
The proof of correctness is then used to prove theories of the form ◻ξ.J M ⊧ ϕ Kξ where
◻ ∈ {∀,∃} by transferring the proof of the Boolean valued result of DecM(ϕ) generated
by the ATP theory.
The type theoretic implementation of DecM is typically inefficient compared to purpose
written tools, because DecM is defined na¨ıvely to simplify the correctness proof. This
inefficiency is exasperated by many implementations of proof systems; specifically relating
to this work, type systems make heavy use of rewriting and normalisation resulting in
large terms which would consume vast resources in attempting to evaluate DecM on
all but the simplest examples. For this reason, we replace DecM with an actual ATP
tool for an efficient implementation. See Section 3 for more information regarding the
implementation.
In order to obtain consistency, the ATP tool overriding type theoretic implementation
of DecM needs to be consistent with the decision procedure. Therefore most examples of
semi-decision procedures are excluded, since a na¨ıve implementation and an actual ATP
tool would usually differ on, when to return an undefined result. A precise formulation
of this fact is given in the following lemma:
Lemma 2.1 (Built-In Consistent).
Assume a function f ∶ A→ B is overridden by an implementation f ′ ∶ A→ B such that
the following holds:
— If there is a closed term a ∶ A and a defining equation of f of the form f a = b then
b = f ′ a;
— For at least one element a ∶ A, f a returns a different result from f ′ a.
Then the resulting type theory is inconsistent.
Remark: Note that if a function f ∶ A → B has a defining equation of the from f a = b
for some closed a ∶ A, and it is overridden by f ′ with f ′ a = b′, then f a will always
evaluate to b′ and we don’t have access to the defining equation f a = b any more.
Proof. Let f ′′ be a function of type A → B, which is defined in Agda by using the
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same case distinction as f , however at the right-hand side by referring to f rather than
recursively calling f ′′. By using the same case distinction as f for f ′′, it follows imme-
diately that we can prove in type theory ∀x ∶ A . f x = f ′′ x (since for open terms a
the definition of f is not overridden, and for closed terms a we have that f a and f a′
coincide).
Let a ∶ A be such that the original value of f a differs from f ′ a. In the recursive
evaluation of f a there must be a term a′ (which can be a itself) such that f a′ is
evaluated incorrectly by the tool, but all recursive calls used in evaluating f a′ are
evaluated correctly. Therefore f ′′ a returns the result of the non-overridden function f ,
whereas evaluating f a′ returns a different result (because it is being overridden). We
obtain that f a′ ≠ f a′, contradicting ∀x ∶ A . f x = f ′′ x.
The technique presented here is generic and abstract; it does not only apply to type
theoretic applications but generally within combining mechanised and un-mechanised
mathematics. To solidify the above technique two examples are presented, Boolean tau-
tology checking and CTL model-checking in Section 2.3 and Section 2.4, respectively.
2.3. SAT
In this work, standard Boolean satisfiability is not applied; instead tautology testing of
a Boolean valued formula with variables is explored, which is an equivalent problem.
Tautology checking was chosen over satisfiability testing because SAT verification typi-
cally relates to checking safety properties, that is, that something undesirable will never
happen.
In the case of SAT the model contains no information, and for completeness it is
the canonical element from a singleton set. The environment assigns Boolean values to
the variables in the formula. Before introducing the definition of Boolean formulæ with
variables, the notion of finite sets are introduced as they index the variables. Finite, or
enumeration sets, Fin ∶ (n ∶ N) → Set are finite sets with n distinct elements, namely
Fin n ∶= {0, . . . , n − 1}; notably Fin 0 = ∅.
Boolean formulæ are defined as follows:
data BooleanFormula (n ∶ N) ∶ Set where
const ∶ Bool→ BooleanFormula n
var ∶ Fin n → BooleanFormula n
¬ ∶ BooleanFormula n→ BooleanFormula n
∧ ∨ ⇒ ∶ BooleanFormula n→ BooleanFormula n→ BooleanFormula n
where the underscores ( ) denote syntactic positions of required arguments. In the fol-
lowing we write xn for (var n).
The semantics a of BooleanFormula with respect to an environment is
J K ∶ ∀{n}→ BooleanFormula n→ (Fin n→ Bool)→ Set
J const b Kξ = T b
J xi Kξ = ξ i
J ¬ϕ Kξ = (JϕKξ)→ ∅
J ϕ ∧ψ Kξ = JϕKξ × JψKξ
J ϕ ∨ψ Kξ = JϕKξ + JψKξ
J ϕ⇒ ψ Kξ = JϕKξ → JψKξ
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To define the decision procedure, assume a function
instantiate ∶ BooleanFormula (suc n)→ Bool→ BooleanFormula n
that instantiates all occurrences of x0 with the second (Boolean valued) argument; all
other variables are shifted down by one, i.e. xn+1 ↦ xn.
The decision procedure for tautology checking a BooleanFormula n is defined na¨ıvely
rather than using (Davis, Putnam & Robinson 1961). The reason is that it simplifies the
correctness proof. It is defined by 2n applications of instantiate, then canonically with
respect to the Boolean connectives.
tautology ∶ ∀n → BooleanFormula n→ Bool
tautology zero (const b) = b
tautology zero (¬ ϕ) = ¬(tautology ϕ)
tautology zero (ϕ◻ ψ) = (tautology zero ϕ) ◻ (tautology zero ψ)
tautology (suc n) ϕ = tautology n (instantiate ϕ true) ∧
tautology n (instantiate ϕ false)
where ◻ ∈ {∧,∨,⇒}.
A proof of correctness is then an element of:
∀n . (ϕ ∶ BooleanFormula n)→ (T (tautologyn ϕ)↔ ((ξ ∶ Fin n → Bool) → J ϕ Kξ))
which is proven by simple induction over n.
The above embedding of Boolean tautology checking has been implemented in Agda
requiring 39 lines of code for the decision procedure and associated definitions (including
natural numbers and Booleans). The proof of correctness requires an additional ≈ 100
lines of code which includes many basic lemmata about products, sums and the function-
type (Curry-Howard isomorphism). The decision procedure is then overridden by a call
to an external SAT solver. See Section 3.2 for a discussion of the results. The code can
be downloaded from the project home page (see Section 6).
2.4. CTL Model-Checking
One aim of this work is to use Agda to develop and verify control systems for safety and
liveness properties. To this end we have outlined a process of embedding CTL model-
checking of finite-state machines.
When dealing with theorems which have substantial structure, such as model-checking
that is defined over a transition system, it is important to choose definitions that simplify
the embedding process. The transitions systems used here are finite and can deadlock,
i.e. the transition relation is not total.
Finite-state machines (FSM) are the transition systems used in this work. They are
defined by the number of states, the number of atomic propositions, an initial state, a
transition relation between states and a labelling of the states. The transition relation is
given by two functions: arrow which determines for each state the number of transitions
from it, and transition which determines for each state and arrow from this state the
Kanso and Setzer 12
successor state.
data FSM ∶ Set where
fsm ∶ (state atom ∶ N)
→ (arrow ∶ Fin state → N)
→ (initial ∶ Fin state)
→ (transition ∶ (s ∶ Fin state)→ Fin (arrow s)→ Fin state)
→ (label ∶ Fin state → Fin atom → Bool)
→ FSM
The model of the CTL model-checking is a pair consisting of the transition system
M and current state s0. The environment (under combined operators) is an infinite run
< s0, s1, ... > rooted at the current state s0. Note that the current state s0 is fixed and
runs starting in s0 are what are quantified over. The runs are defined by means of a
co-algebraic data-type.
data RunM (s ∶ Fin stateM) ∶ Set where
next ∶ (a ∶ Fin (arrowM s))→∞RunM (transitionM s a)→ RunM s
where∞ prefixes a term that can potentially be unfolded infinitely many times. In Agda,
co-algebraic types are represented using the built-in postulated function ∞.
In the following, we write runi for the i
th state in run = < s0, s1, ..., si, ... >. pi is used
for finite paths and pii is the i
th state in pi.
CTL formulæ can be defined over the model using a minimal set of combined CTL
operators (Huth & Ryan 2004). EX - exists next, EG - exists globally, E[ U ] - exists
until and P - state proposition.
data CTL (M ∶ FSM) ∶ Set where
false ∶ CTLM
¬ EX EG ∶ CTLM → CTLM
∨ E[ U ] ∶ CTLM → CTLM → CTLM
P ∶ Fin atomM → CTLM
where atomM is atom projected from M.
The semantics of a CTL formula is as follows: false, ¬ and ∨ are the same as in
propositional logic. P a has the meaning that atomic proposition a holds in the current
state. The remaining cases specify properties about infinite runs of the transition system
rooted at some state s. Exists next (EX ϕ) holds when there exists a run run from s
such that ϕ holds at run1 . Exists globally (EG ϕ) holds when there exists a run from s
such that at each point i on the run, ϕ holds. Exists until (E[ϕUψ]) holds when there
exists a run from s such that there exists a point k where ψ holds, and for all points
j < k, ϕ holds.
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The semantics of a CTL formula with respect to a model is




J M , s ⊧ false K = ∅
J M , s ⊧ ¬ϕ K = J M , s ⊧ ϕ K→ ∅
J M , s ⊧ ϕ ∨ ψ K = J M , s ⊧ ϕ K + J M , s ⊧ ψ K
J M , s ⊧ P a K = T (labelM s a)
J M , s ⊧ EX ϕ K = ∃ (run ∶ RunM s) J M , run1 ⊧ ϕ K
J M , s ⊧ EG ϕ K = ∃ (run ∶ RunM s) (∀i J M , runi ⊧ ϕ K)
J M , s ⊧ E[ϕUψ] K = ∃ (run ∶ RunM s) ∃ (k ∶ N)
((∀j < k J M , runj ⊧ ϕ K) × J M , runk ⊧ ψ K)
where labelM is label projected fromM. Here the environment (RunM s) is existentially
quantified.
Determining whether a CTL formula holds in the Boolean operator cases is canonical
with respect to the operators and not discussed further. The decision procedure for the
first substantial operator, EX ϕ (exists next) does this by searching for a path of length
stateM +1 and verifying that ϕ holds at the second point, i.e. there exists a successor
state where ϕ holds. The argument for correctness of this procedure is a simpler case of
correctness for exists globally, and follows by Lemma 2.2 (see below).
In the case of EG ϕ (exists globally), an infinite run is required such that at each
point on this run, ϕ holds. Na¨ıvely checking each point on this run would take an infinite
amount of time, thus we finitise the problem.
The pigeonhole principle¶ (Dedekind 1863) (which is the principle underlying the proof
of the pumping lemma (Bar-Hillel, Perles & Shamir 1964)), and the finiteness of the
transition system allow the decision procedure for EG to check for a finite path of fixed
length from the state s such that ϕ always holds. If a path pi of length stateM +1 exists
from s such that ϕ holds at each point, then it can be extended infinitely many times
into a run. This follows by Lemma 2.2 (see below).
Remark: The proofs of Lemmata 2.2 & 2.3 are given in detail since the Agda repre-
sentations are essentially the same proofs.
Lemma 2.2 (M, s ⊧ EG ϕ). Assume a finite transition systemM with n states. There
exists an infinite run from state s such that ϕ holds at each point iff there exists a path
pi of length n + 1 from state s such that ϕ holds at each point on pi.
Proof.
⇒ An infinite run where ϕ holds at each point can be truncated to a path of length n+1.
⇐ By the pigeonhole principle, at least one state has been repeated in pi, i.e. ∃(0 ≤ i <
¶ The pigeonhole principle states: if you put n things into m boxes where n > m, then there exists at
least one box that contains more than one item.
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j ≤ n) . pii = pij . Therefore a (possibly trivial) loop in the transition system exists
containing pii, this loop can be repeated infinitely many times, and we obtain an
infinite run.
In the case of exists until, things are a little more complicated. E[ϕUψ] means there
exists an infinite run run such that at some point k in the future ψ must hold, but up
to and not including that point, ϕ must hold. Intuitively, the decision procedure checks
for a path piϕ with length ≤ stateM such that ϕ holds at each point, and then checks for
a path piψ of length stateM +1 starting at the end of piϕ such that ψ holds at piψ1 . This
follows by Lemma 2.3.
Lemma 2.3. Assume a finite transition systemM with n states. M, s ⊧ E[ϕUψ] holds
iff there exists a path piϕ with length ≤ n from the state s such that ϕ holds at each
point of piϕ, and there exists a path piψ of length n + 1 such that the end of piϕ equals




⇒ There exists a point k on the infinite run run, such that for all points j < k, ϕ holds
and at point k, ψ holds. We show that piϕ and piψ exist by induction on k:
case k ≤ n:We are done, piϕ is a prefix of the run, and piψ equals the succeeding n+1
states from k.
case k > n: By the pigeonhole principle there exists two points 0 ≤ l <m < n + 1 such
that run l = runm. Therefore a loop exists before point k, this loop can be removed
such that ϕ holds up to point k−(m− l) and ψ holds at point k−(m− l). Let run′
be the resulting run. By the induction hypothesis and run ′, the assertion follows.
⇐ By Lemma 1, path piψ can be extended infinitely many times, thus an infinite run can
be constructed consisting of piψ extended infinitely many times concatenated to piϕ.
As ϕ holds along piϕ, and ψ holds at piψ
1
, the infinite run satisfies ϕ until ψ.
The decision procedures for EX, EG and E[ U ] can be implemented by bounded
traversals of the transition system and taking disjunctions between choice points in the
traversals. Our implementation requires ≈75 lines of Agda code; this includes the defini-
tions of Booleans, natural numbers, finite numbers, transition system, CTL formulæ and
the decision procedure. The proof of correctness requires > 1000 lines of code because this
includes the proof of the pigeonhole principle (≈ 300 lines of code) and many lemmata
reasoning about finite sets and the transition system.
3. Implementation
So far, everything presented has been fully contained in the ITP tool’s logic, but in
practise evaluating these decision procedures is inefficient when compared to purpose
written ATP tools. Generally this is because ITP tools are interpreters which result in a
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layer of abstraction between program and the hardware. Specifically in the case of Agda,
this is because mechanisation of a type system looses the low-level procedural access
(such as fast arrays and bit flipping operations) to the computer needed for efficient
implementations. Another reason is that the decision procedure written in the ITP tool
is chosen to be simple but inefficient, in order to facilitate the proof of its correctness.
For this reason, we customised the ITP and programming language Agda to allow for
the type-checker to call external ATP tools in-situ of evaluating the decision procedures.
This involved extending the existing built-in mechanism to execute external tools (in
addition to executing Haskell functions).
Both of the examples presented in this paper have been fully implemented in Agda.
Two branches of the Agda source were taken, one for SAT and the other for CTL.
Each of these branches were customised by providing translations between Agda terms
representing the problem set and the tool’s input language, an axiom check of the decision
procedure and the file path to the external tool. The axiom checks guarantees that the
overridden Agda function is defined correctly. The external tools are wrapped by a script
that parse the output, and determine a Boolean valued result (or, if parsing fails, raises
a type-checking exception) which is transferred back to Agda. Then as a final step,
within Agda we provide the necessary definitions from Section 2.2 such that they pass
the axiom check. These two branches provide a significant level of soundness from the
end-users perspective as the user cannot modify the definition of the decision procedure
as it would then fail the axiom check and raise a type-checking error; nor can the user
change the external tool that is executed as it is hard-coded.
These branches required a significant amount of effort to implement as knowledge of
Agda’s internals is required. To simplify the process of connecting Agda to an external
tool, we devised and implemented a third branch of Agda’s code that provides a generic
plug-in interface for executing external tools. It should be noted that this interface trades
soundness (a normal user can break the system) for usability (no re-compilation of Agda
required).
3.1. Plug-in Interface
We have modified Agda by adding six tags to the type-checker. Definitions in the plug-
in (Agda source file) can then be tagged. The internals of the type-checker can, while
type-checking subsequent terms, reference a tagged definition by name. The first tag
ATPProblem tags something in Set which corresponds to the problem set that the
decision procedure is defined over. The second tag ATPInput depends upon the first
tag, and tags a function of type ATPProblem→ String that translates the problem into
a string that is passed to the external tool. The third tag ATPTool tags a string which
is a path to the external tool; and the fourth tag, ATPDecProc tags the actual decision
procedure which must be of the type ATPProblem→ Bool.
The plug-in mechanism will not be activated until a proof of correctness has been
provided; the final two tags, tag the semantic relation and a proof of correctness. The
intuition behind these final two tags is that they force the user to prove that the provided
decision procedure implements their chosen ATP theory. Typically this step of proving
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will ensure that the user has thought about what it is they are doing, hence mitigating
the risk of providing the wrong external tool for their chosen ATP theory, e.g. entering
a SAT solver in-place of an SMT solver. This does not prevent a malicious user breaking
the system, nor preventing the use of an inconsistent tool.
When the function tagged by ATPDecProc is reduced on γ ∶ ATPProblem, the type-
checker will execute the external tool pointed to by ATPTool. But, it first applies the
function tagged by ATPInput to γ that yields a string in the tool’s input language.
The Boolean valued result is computed by examining the return value of the tool.
Should the tool return 0 a true value is used, should the tool return 1 then false is used;
any other value results in an exception being raised and the tools output dumped into the
log. These values were chosen to conform to POSIX standards. Typically it is required
to write a wrapper script for the external tool that parses the output of the tool and sets
the return values accordingly.
We have successfully re-implemented the SAT and CTL interfaces within this generic
plug-in framework, by replacing the axiom check with a proof of correctness. In terms
of flexibility, this approach is very powerful as it has allowed us to extend with minimal
effort the CTL interface to provide symbolic CTL. Then we extended the symbolic CTL
to a customised temporal logic that is defined over ladder logic programs (IEC 61131-
3). Therefore when executing the model-checker the original structure of the program is
preserved (instead of computing its transition system). The correctness proof is given by
the composition of the correctness proofs of CTL and symbolic CTL model-checking.
3.1.1. Type-Checking Justifications. Checking justifications produced by external tools is
possible (and has been experimentally implemented for SAT) in this generic framework by
tagging a function that takes a proof-tree generated by the external tool, and constructs
a proof-object from it. When the function is evaluated on a proof-tree, the type-checker
is triggered, and it checks that the proof-tree is correct with respect to the necessary in-
ference rules. This function then implicitly overrides the soundness proof for closed terms
using the same mechanism that the external tool overrides the decision procedure. This
is the same approach taken by (Armand, Gre´goire, Spiwack & The´ry 2010) in Coq where
refutation traces are type-checked using reflexive methods. According to Section 1.1, this
approach is categorised as, oracles with justifications.
3.2. Results
Without connecting Agda to an efficient SAT solver implementation, we struggled to
show validity of formulæ with ≥ 10 variables using the na¨ıve decision procedure due to
the exorbitant resources (time and space) required by the type-checker. The connection
between Agda and Boolean tautology checking has proven to be useful. It is often the
case while proving properties about industrial systems that proof obligations arise which
can be proven by showing the validity of a Boolean valued formula, which has now
been automated. The solvers currently supported by the system are iProver, eProver
and z3; potentially many more solvers are compatible as the interface uses the TPTP
language (Sutcliffe 2009) to communicate with the solver.
Mathematical Structures in Computer Science 17
We have used this system to successfully verify a real world interlocking system pro-
vided by the first author’s sponsor, Invensys Rail, UK. More information about the
verification technique can be found in (Kanso, Moller & Setzer 2009, Kanso 2008). These
problems had ≈ 1500 variables, well within the feasible range. Currently we are facing
the problem that the type-checker takes (< 5 minutes) on initial checking of the inter-
locking system files and computing proof obligations for the SAT solver; once compiled
to native code (via ghc) and executed, this problem is mitigated (in tests, problems with
≈ 5000 variables were solved, and proofs fully explored in ≈ 1 second). Work is ongoing
to identify resource leaks in Agda.
The CTL model-checking presented here has been lifted to a more useful variant,
namely symbolic CTL model-checking. This simplifies specifying and checking properties
about non-trivial programs. Due to inefficiencies in Agda, computing the models is time
consuming and resulted in the CTL plug-in being of limited practical use when compared
to the SAT plug-in. The model-checker NuSMV is supported. NuSMV requires that the
transition relation is total, where as our models are not. We made the transition relation
total by transforming the state machine and CTL formulæ in Agda, and proving that
this transformation preserves correctness.
4. Example – Pelicon Crossing
In this and the next section we discuss how to combine ITP and ATP in order to prove the
safety of an actual system, while reducing the validation problem. Consider the simple
scenario of a road crossing in Figure 1. For this scenario we will abstractly state the
safety of a crossing, then introduce signalling principles, and show using ITP that these
imply safety of the crossing. Finally we show using ATP that an implementation fulfils






Fig. 1. Layout of a Pelicon crossing. They consist of two sets of lights, the smaller set for the
pedestrians and the larger set for road traffic. In this diagram only two aspects are shown for
road traffic, but in practise a third aspect for warning the lights are about to change would
also be present. Also, a button for the pedestrians is present but not depicted. The areas T1
and T2 are for road traffic, P1 and P2 are for pedestrians, and MUX (mutual-exclusion)
represents the area of the crossing used by both road traffic (travelling between T1 and T2
through MUX) and pedestrians (travelling between P1 and P2 through MUX).
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On roads in the UK (and many other countries) there are Pedestrian Light Controlled
(Pelicon) crossings, see Figure 1; they consist of two sets of lights, one for road traffic
and one for pedestrians. A pedestrian indicates to the Pelicon crossing that they wish
to cross the road by pressing a button; after a small delay, road traffic will be shown a
red (transitioning from green) light and pedestrians will be shown a green (transitioning
from red) light that indicates it is now safe to cross the road. After a further delay the
lights transition back. Formally for a given time t the Pelicon crossing can be modelled
abstractly as
numbercarst ∶ Area→ N
numberpedst ∶ Area→ N
movingcarst ∶ Area→ Area→ N
movingpedst ∶ Area→ Area→ N
traffict ∶ {green, red}
pedestriant ∶ {green, red}
where Area ∶= {T1,T2,P1,P2,MUX}, see Figure 1 for the location of these areas.
Initially at time 0 it is assumed that there is no road traffic in, or moving into MUX;
similarly for pedestrians. The initial axioms for road traffic are
numbercars0 MUX ≡ 0 movingcars0 T1 MUX ≡ 0 movingcars0 T2 MUX ≡ 0
The axioms for cars travelling between areas T1 and T2 (via MUX) are
traffict ≡ red→ movingcars(t+1) T1 MUX ≡ 0 ∧movingcars(t+1) T2 MUX ≡ 0
movingcars(t+1) MUX T2 ≡movingcarst T1 MUX
movingcars(t+1) MUX T1 ≡movingcarst T2 MUX
movingcars(t+1) T1 MUX ≤ numbercarst T1
movingcars(t+1) T2 MUX ≤ numbercarst T2
numbercars(t+1) MUX ≡ (numbercarst MUX)
+(movingcars(t+1) T1 MUX) − (movingcars(t+1) MUX T1)
+(movingcars(t+1) T2 MUX) − (movingcars(t+1) MUX T2)
The axioms for the pedestrians travelling between areas P1 and P2 (via MUX) are similar
but not presented. It is also required to have axioms for the well-formedness, such as cars
are never in P1 or P2 and that cars do not travel directly between T1 and T2, similarly
for pedestrians.
In this setting the notion of actual “safety” which still remains to be validated by
domain experts is that “at any point in time exclusive use of the crossing is given to
pedestrians or to road traffic”,
∀t . numbercarst MUX ≡ 0 ∨ numberpedst MUX ≡ 0
this is the desired property that we wish to prove.
In the following, safety principles are lemmata which imply actual “safety”. A safety
principle can be viewed as an intermediate lemma, typically deduced from principles
in the target domain. Safety conditions are concrete formulæ, which reduce (e.g. via
induction) to formulæ over finite domains provable by ATP, and which imply a/some
safety principle/s. For example, in the train domain there exists a large volume of lit-
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erature detailing various signalling principles which in our setting correspond to safety
conditions .
A safety principle which implies this notion of “safety” is “at any point in time only
road traffic or pedestrians are allowed to enter the crossing”,
∀t . (movingcarst T1 MUX ≡ 0 ∧movingcarst T2 MUX ≡ 0)
∨(movingpedst P1 MUX ≡ 0 ∧movingpedst P2 MUX ≡ 0)
For a given Pelicon control system, giving a direct proof of the safety principle or actual
“safety” would be a cumbersome activity as ATP tools do not typically yield abstract
solutions, but concrete solutions for concrete problems. Our solution is to use the ATP
tool to give a concrete proof of the safety condition “pedestrians have a green light or
road traffic has green light, but not both”,
∀t . traffict ≡ red∨pedestriant ≡ red
and prove that this implies the safety principle (and in-turn “safety”). It should be noted
that the safety condition should be representable in terms of a specific control system’s
output (and possibly input/internal) variables.
We have shown in Agda that the stated safety condition implies the safety principle
which in turn implies “safety”. We have also shown in Agda (using ATP) that a standard
implementation of the Pelicon crossing implies this safety condition. Therefore we have
shown in Agda using a combination of ITP and ATP that the implementation is safe.
Thus, part of the validation procedure has been reduced to a verification procedure
(using ITP). It still remains to validate that the concept of “safety” used here is correct,
and that the abstract model is correct.
From our experience with verifying train control systems (Kanso et al. 2009, Kanso
2008), proving that the safety conditions imply “safety” is more complicated than with
this scenario. In the train domain there is a larger volume of domain knowledge which
must be considered and many more signalling principles (that change between train
lines). In these non-trivial situations, it could be the case that the safety conditions are
shown not to be sufficient or that some are not necessary.
5. Case Study – Gwili Steam Railway
A substantially larger example than the pelicon crossing is of Gwili Steam Railway, a
small historic railway maintained as a tourist attraction. This is a step towards verifying a
large railway control system. The interlocking is mechanical, and controlled by a number
of leavers; each leaver controls a piece of track-side equipment such as a signal, a set of
points or locks a set of points (known as a facing-point lock). When a leaver is pulled a
series of connected metal rods/bars are also moved within the interlocking. If any of these
rods/bars are constrained, then the leaver cannot be moved (i.e. locked). Interlocking
systems of this form are specified by locking tables, where a typical entry in the table
indicates for a leaver, which other leavers are to be pulled and which leavers should
not be pulled for it to be free to move; once pulled the leaver will lock the referenced
leavers into their positions (Woodbridge n.d.). Therefore the locking table completely
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specifies the constraints that the interlocking system must fulfil and is what was verified
in this study. More information about the railway domain can be found in (Kerr &
Rowbotham 2001, Nock 2002, Leach 2003).
The notion of safety used in this study is that trains do not collide and trains do not
travel in the facing (diverging) direction over a set of unlocked points ; the first conjunct
is canonical with respect to loss-of-life and hence safety, whereas the second conjunct
ensures that an occupied set of points cannot be moved, hence mitigating a common
cause of derailments. To formalise these requirements is was necessary to provide a formal
model of a railyard’s topology and a model of the topology’s state. To prove this notion
of safety, the signalling principles are specified and proven that they imply the safety of
the system. Finally ATP tools are used to provide proofs that the interlocking system
fulfils the signalling principles .
The interlocking controlled part of Gwili’s topology can be seen in Figure 2, and











Fig. 2. Gwili topology, the dots on the left indicate a single block segment protected by signal
16 (spanning to and including the next stations) that only one train is allowed to occupy at
any time. The numbers relate to the controlling leaver, i.e. when leaver 3 has not been pulled,
signal 3 shows the danger aspect and when leaver 3 is pulled then signal 3 shows a proceed
aspect. The precise differences between the three types of signals (e.g. 3, C5 and 17) is not
relevant for this verification and they are treated as main signals. With respect to safety it is
clear that signal 4 and 19 should never both be set to proceed as they protect the same part of
the track (but in opposite directions), similarly for C5, 7, 18 and 20. Track segments are
depicted by horizontal/diagonal lines and delimited by small vertical lines.
Before showing how these topologies are represented, it should be noted that a route
with respect to railway signalling can only start at a main signal and ends at the next
main signal. Thus each route is in one-to-one correspondence with the signals and spans
a number of track segments. E.g. there is a route from signal 3 to signal 4, another from





Connected ∶ Route→ Route→ Set
SegInRoute ∶ Segment→ Route → Set
FacingInRoute ∶ Segment→ Route → Set
where axiom Single-Entry-Point is required to hold; it ensures that the routes are well-
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formed.
∀rt1 rt2 rt3 . Connected rt1 rt2 → Connected rt3 rt2
→ ∃ts . (SegInRoute ts rt1 ∧ SegInRoute ts rt3)
(Single-Entry-Point)
The state of the topology is defined over time, and given as
trainRoutet ∶ Train→ Route
signalAspectt ∶ Route → {proceed,danger}
lockedt ∶ Segment→ {locked,unlocked}
It could be the case that trains ignore the signals and proceed past a danger aspect.
As this study was interested in showing correctness of the interlocking system and not
obedience of trains to signals, axiom Correct-Trains is required to hold to ensure that
trains are well-behaved.
∀t train . (trainRoutet train ≡ trainRoutet+1 train) ∨
(Connected (trainRoutet train) (trainRoutet+1 train) ∧
signalAspectt (trainRoutet+1 train) ≡ proceed)
(Correct-Trains)
To show that an interlocking system is safe, it is required to introduce the following
four signalling principles:
∀t route1 route2 segment . route1 ≢ route2
→ SegInRoute segment route1 ∧ SegInRoute segment route2
→ signalAspectt route1 ≡ danger ∨ signalAspectt route2 ≡ danger
(Opposing)
∀t train segment route . SegInRoute segment (trainRoutet train)
→ SegInRoute segment route
→ signalAspectt route ≡ danger
(Signals-Guard)
∀t route segment . signalAspectt route ≡ proceed
→ SegInRoute segment route
→ FacingInRoute segment route
→ lockedt segment ≡ locked
(Proceed-Locked)
∀t train segment . SegInRoute segment (trainRoutet train)
→ lockedt segment ≡ locked
→ lockedt+1 segment ≡ locked
(Train-Holds-Lock)
The first conjunct of the notion of safety expresses that trains do not collide, and is
formalised in Theorem 5.1. It is required initially that all the trains occupy different
routes.
∀train1 train2 segment . train1 ≢ train2 →
¬(SegInRoute segment (trainRoute0 train1) ∧
SegInRoute segment (trainRoute0 train2))
(Init-Collision-Free)
Theorem 5.1 (Collision Free). Assume axioms Single-Entry-Point , Correct-Trains & Init-
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Collision-Free, and that signalling principles Opposing & Signals-Guard hold. Then
∀t train1 train2 segment . train1 ≢ train2 →
¬(SegInRoute segment (trainRoutet train1) ∧
SegInRoute segment (trainRoutet train2))
The proof follows by case distinction on whether train1 and train2 have changed routes
and from the signalling principles Opposing & Signals-Guard . Signalling principle Op-
posing expresses that two routes with a common track segment cannot both be set to
proceed at the same time. Signalling principle Signals-Guard expresses that any route
that has a common track segment with the route a train is currently occupying must
show danger aspects. Note that an inexperienced user might overlook the need for the
signalling principle Opposing, which is required in order to make sure that two trains
don’t enter the same segment. When carrying out a formal proof of Theorem 5.1 the
need for such a principle is revealed. This demonstrates that in more complicated real
world examples formal proofs using ITP can be crucial to guarantee that the signalling
principles are complete in order to guarantee safety.
The second conjunct of the notion of safety expresses that trains do not make facing
moves over unlocked sets of points, and is formalised in Theorem 5.2. It is required
initially that no train occupies an unlocked facing segment.
∀train segment . SegInRoute segment (trainRoute0 train)
→ FacingInRoute segment (trainRoute0 train)
→ locked0 segment ≡ locked
(Init-Facing)
Theorem 5.2 (Facing-Point Lock). Assume axioms Correct-Trains & Init-Facing;
and that signalling principles Proceed-Locked & Train-Holds-Lock hold, then
∀t train segment . SegInRoute segment (trainRoutet train)
→ FacingInRoute segment (trainRoutet train)
→ lockedt segment ≡ locked
The proof of Theorem 5.2 is structurally similar to the proof of Theorem 5.1, but instead
requires the signalling principles Proceed-Locked & Train-Holds-Lock . Signalling princi-
ple Proceed-Locked expresses that when a route shows proceed, then all segments in that
route are locked. Signalling principle Train-Holds-Lock expresses that when the segments
in an occupied route are locked, then they are locked in the next state.
The locking table model of the interlocking system does not have inputs from the track-
side equipment; it only consists of a number of leavers that the signalman must pull. It
is therefore impossible for the interlocking system to model signalling principles Signals-
Guard & Train-Holds-Lock as they require knowledge of the train’s positions. Instead
they are enforced by the signalman who observes the railyard and the positions of the
trains. In this verification it is assumed that the combination that the leavers are pulled
enforce these conditions, i.e. the signalman operates correctly. It should be noted that
modern solid-state interlocking systems are provided with train/track detection inputs
(as well as many others) so this problem disappears. All that remains is to show that
the interlocking system fulfils signalling principles Opposing & Proceed-Locked as they
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express the conditions under when a route can show the proceed aspect. Due to the
finite domains that the topology is built over, it is possible to represent these signalling
principles in terms of the output variables of the interlocking, which is then given to
a SAT solver to determine un-satisfiablity, after splitting the signalling principles into
base and inductive cases. In both cases it was determined that the interlocking system
fulfilled the principles. Therefore, by assuming that the signalman does not violate the sig-
nalling principles Signals-Guard & Train-Holds-Lock , trains obey signals (axiom Correct-
Trains), and showing that the topology fulfils axiom Single-Entry-Point , and showing
that the system is initially safe (axioms Init-Collision-Free & Init-Facing), a proof of
Theorems 5.1 & 5.2 is obtained, showing that the system is safe.
Using the fact that Agda is also a programming language, the locking table was com-
piled into an interactive program that simulates the interlocking system. It repeatedly
requests for the signalman to enter which leaver they wish to move, then executes an
iteration of the program and prints out the state of the system.
We have successfully applied this technique to a sizable modern interlocking system.
It was shown in Agda that the interlocking system fulfilled the signalling principles Op-
posing, Proceed-Locked , Signals-Guard & Train-Holds-Lock . It still remains to have the
model and notion of safety validated. In future work we would like to have validated
models. This will require a significant amount of work to formalise the signalling princi-
ples and prove that safety follows. This is due to the increased complexities of modern
railways. For instance the models would have to consider flank protection and the various
systems that ensure trains do not pass signals at danger, or if they do, stop safely.
6. Concluding Remarks
This paper explored the differences between interactive and automated theorem proving
techniques with a discussion about their respective uses. ATP is used to solve finite con-
crete theorems and ITP to solve infinite abstract theorems. The discussion was concluded
with our motivation for composing these two paradigms, i.e. a proof framework with the
advantages of ATP and ITP.
We have presented a novel approach to embed an arbitrary ATP theory into type
theory, along with two examples of this, namely Boolean tautology checking and CTL
model-checking. In its native form, the technique would be very inefficient so we have
mitigated this by extending Agda to allow an efficient ATP tool to be called in situ. This
has facilitated an efficient framework for proving finite and infinite theorems, specifically
with respect to hardware and software verification.
The technique described can be used to efficiently define a type, such that elements
of this type are correct programs. Such a system would be of use for the development of
critical systems as only correct programs can be written, greatly reducing the amount
of testing needed. Our vision, which has been partly realised for the train domain, is
to use Agda to model domain knowledge; then to develop, verify, compile and execute
a substantial program. The motivation here is that a large portion of the software de-
velopment cycle is contained within a single language and tool; this reduces erroneous
translations between languages that occur within typical verification procedures.
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We have developed a plug-in mechanism that allows for anybody to embed their chosen
ATP theory into Agda by providing the items required in Section 2.2 and Section 3.
This plug-in mechanism (modified Agda code), and plug-ins for SAT and CTL can be
downloaded from the project website at:
http://cs.swansea.ac.uk/~cskarim/agda/
References
Abrial, J.R., M. Butler, S. Hallerstede & L. Voisin (2006), ‘An open extensible tool environment
for Event-B’, Formal Methods and Software Engineering pp. 588–605.
Armand, Michae¨l, Benjamin Gre´goire, Arnaud Spiwack & Laurent The´ry (2010), Extending Coq
with imperative features and its application to SAT verification, inM.Kaufmann & L.Paulson,
eds, ‘Interactive Theorem Proving’, Vol. 6172 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Springer
Berlin / Heidelberg, pp. 83–98. 10.1007/978-3-642-14052-5 8.
Bar-Hillel, Y., M. Perles & E. Shamir (1964), ‘On formal properties of simple phrase struc-
ture grammars’, Language and Information: Selected Essays on their Theory and Application
pp. 116–150.
Barrett, Clark, Roberto Sebastiani, Sanjit A. Seshia & Cesare Tinelli (2009), Satisfiability modulo
theories, in A.Biere, M.Heule, H.van Maaren & T.Walsh, eds, ‘Handbook of Satisfiability’,
Vol. 185, IOS Press, pp. 737–797.
Bierman, G.M., A.D. Gordon, C. Hrit¸cu & D. Langworthy (2010), Semantic subtyping with
an SMT solver, in ‘Proceedings of the 15th ACM SIGPLAN international conference on
Functional Programming’, ACM, pp. 105–116.
Bo¨hme, S. & T. Nipkow (2010), Sledgehammer: Judgement day, in J.Giesl & R.Ha¨hnle, eds,
‘Automated Reasoning’, Vol. 6173, LNCS, pp. 107–121.
Boutin, Samuel (1997), Using reflection to build efficient and certified decision procedures, in
‘Theoretical Aspects of Computer Software’, Vol. 1281 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science,
Springer, pp. 515–529.
Bove, Ana, Peter Dybjer & Ulf Norell (2009), A brief overview of Agda – a functional language
with dependent types, in S.Berghofer, T.Nipkow, C.Urban & M.Wenzel, eds, ‘Theorem Prov-
ing in Higher Order Logics’, Vol. 5674 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Springer Berlin
/ Heidelberg, pp. 73–78. 10.1007/978-3-642-03359-9 6.
Curry, H.B. (1934), ‘Functionality in combinatory logic’, Proceedings of the National Academy
of Sciences of the United States of America 20(11), 584.
Curry, H.B., R. Feys, W. Craig & W. Craig (1958), Combinatory Logic, Vol. 1, North-Holland.
Davis, Martin, Hilary Putnam & Julia Robinson (1961), ‘The decision problem for exponential
diophantine equations’, The Annals of Mathematics 74(3), pp. 425–436.
de Bruijn, N. (1970), The mathematical language AUTOMATH, its usage, and some of its exten-
sions, in M.Laudet, D.Lacombe, L.Nolin & M.Schtzenberger, eds, ‘Symposium on Automatic
Demonstration’, Vol. 125 of Lecture Notes in Mathematics, Springer Berlin / Heidelberg,
pp. 29–61. 10.1007/BFb0060623.
De Moura, L. & N. Bjørner (2009), ‘Satisfiability modulo theories: An appetizer’, Formal Meth-
ods: Foundations and Applications pp. 23–36.
Dedekind, R. (1863), Vorlesungen u¨ber Zahlentheorie, F. Vieweg und Sohn.
Diller, J. & A. S. Troelstra (1984), ‘Realizability and intuitionistic logic’, Synthese 60, 253–282.
10.1007/BF00485463.
Mathematical Structures in Computer Science 25
Dong, Yifei, C. R. Ramakrishnan & Scott A. Smolka (2003), ‘Evidence exploration for model
checking’.
Fontaine, P., J.Y. Marion, S. Merz, L. Nieto & A. Tiu (2006), ‘Expressiveness+ automation+
soundness: Towards combining SMT solvers and interactive proof assistants’, Tools and Al-
gorithms for the Construction and Analysis of Systems pp. 167–181.
Foster, Simon & Georg Struth (2011), Integrating an automated theorem prover into Agda, in
M.Bobaru, K.Havelund, G.Holzmann & R.Joshi, eds, ‘NASA Formal Methods’, Vol. 6617 of
Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Springer Berlin / Heidelberg, pp. 116–130. 10.1007/978-
3-642-20398-5 10.
Harrison, J. (2008), Automated and interactive theorem proving, in O.Grumberg, T.Nipkow &
C.Pfaller, eds, ‘Formal Logical Methods for System Security and Correctness’, Vol. 14 of
NATO Science for Peace and Security Series, IOS Press, pp. 111–147.
Hendriks, D. (2002), ‘Proof reflection in coq’, Journal of Automated Reasoning 29(3), 277–307.
Howard, W.A. (1980), ‘The formulae-as-types notion of construction’, To HB Curry: Essays on
Combinatory Logic, Lambda Calculus and Formalism 44, 479–490.
Huth, M. & M. Ryan (2004), Logic in Computer Science, Cambridge University Press Cambridge.
Jones, C.B., G. Grov & A. Bundy (2010), Ideas for a high-level proof strategy language, Technical
Report CS-TR-1210, Newcastle University.
Kanso, K. (2008), Formal verification of ladder logic, Master’s thesis, Dept. Computer Science,
Swansea University.
Kanso, K., F. Moller & A. Setzer (2009), ‘Automated verification of signalling principles in
railway interlocking systems’, Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 250(2), 19–
31.
Kerr, D. & T. Rowbotham (2001), Introduction to Railway Signalling, Institution of Railway
Signal Engineers.
Leach, M. (2003), RAILWAY Control Systems, 2nd edn, Institution of Railway Signal Engineers.
Lescuyer, Ste´phane & Sylvain Conchon (2008), A reflexive formalization of a SAT solver in coq,
in ‘TPHOLs 2008: Emerging Trends of the 21st International Conference on Theorem Proving
in Higher Order Logics’.
Mu¨ller, Olaf & Tobias Nipkow (1995), Combining model checking and deduction for i/o- au-
tomata, in E.Brinksma, W.Cleaveland, K.Larsen, T.Margaria & B.Steffen, eds, ‘Tools and
Algorithms for the Construction and Analysis of Systems’, Vol. 1019 of Lecture Notes in
Computer Science, Springer Berlin / Heidelberg, pp. 1–16.
Nock, O.S. (2002), Railway Signalling, 2nd edn, Institution of Railway Signal Engineers.
Nordstro¨m, B., K. Petersson & J.M. Smith (1990), Programming in Martin-Lo¨f ’s Type Theory,
Vol. 7 of International Series of Monographs on Computer Science, Oxford University Press.
Owre, S., J. Rushby & N. Shankar (1992), ‘PVS: A prototype verification system’, Automated
Deduction CADE-11 pp. 748–752.
Paulson, L. & K. Susanto (2007), Source-level proof reconstruction for interactive theorem prov-
ing, in K.Schneider & J.Brandt, eds, ‘Theorem Proving in Higher Order Logics’, Vol. 4732,
LNCS, pp. 232–245.
Stump, Aaron (2009), ‘Proof Checking Technology for Satisfiability Modulo Theories’, Electronic
Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 228, 121 – 133.
Sutcliffe, G. (2009), ‘The TPTP Problem Library and Associated Infrastructure: The FOF and
CNF Parts, v3.5.0’, Journal of Automated Reasoning 43(4), 337–362.
Verma, Kumar Neeraj (2000), Reflecting symbolic model checking in coq, Master’s thesis,
Me´moire de DEA, DEA Programmation, Paris.
Kanso and Setzer 26
Weber, Tjark (2006), ‘Integrating a SAT Solver with an LCF-style Theorem Prover’, Electronic
Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 144(2), 67 – 78. Proceedings of the Third Workshop
on Pragmatics of Decision Procedures in Automated Reasoning (PDPAR 2005).
Woodbridge, Peter (n.d.), ‘Locking frame testing’.
URL: http://www.signalbox.org/branches/pw/index.htm
Woodcock, J., P.G. Larsen, J. Bicarregui & J. Fitzgerald (2009), ‘Formal methods: Practice and
experience’, ACM Computing Surveys (CSUR) 41(4), 1–36.
